Ramp secret sharing (SS) schemes can be classified into strong ramp SS schemes and weak ramp SS schemes. The strong ramp SS schemes do not leak out any part of a secret explicitly even in the case that some information about the secret leaks out from some set of shares, and hence, they are more desirable than the weak ramp SS schemes. In this paper, it is shown that for any feasible general access structure, a strong ramp SS scheme can be constructed from a partially decryptable ramp SS scheme, which can be considered as a kind of SS scheme with plural secrets. As a byproduct, it is pointed out that threshold ramp SS schemes based on Shamir's polynomial interpolation method are not always strong.
can be generalized to so-called general access structures which consist of the families of qualified sets and forbidden sets. A qualified set is the subset of shares that can decrypt the secret, but any information does not leak out from any forbidden set. Generally, the efficiency of SS schemes is evaluated by the entropy of each share, and it must hold that H(V i ) ≥ H(S) where H(S) and H(V i ) are the entropies of secret S and shares V i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, respectively (3; 4).
In order to improve the efficiency of SS schemes, ramp SS schemes are proposed, which have a trade-off between security and coding efficiency (5; 6; 7; 8; 9) . In ramp SS schemes, we can consider intermediate sets, which are neither qualified nor forbidden sets, and hence, leak out partly the information of secret S. For instance, in the (k, L, n)-threshold ramp SS scheme (5; 6), we can decrypt S from arbitrary k or more shares, but no information of S can be obtained from any k − L or less shares. Furthermore, an arbitrary set of k − shares is an intermediate set which leaks out about S with equivocation ( /L)H(S) for = 1, 2, . . . , L. In the case of L = 1, the (k, L, n)-threshold ramp SS scheme reduces to the ordinal (k, n)-threshold SS scheme. Hence, to distinguish ordinal SS schemes with ramp SS schemes, we call ordinal SS schemes perfect SS schemes. For any (k, L, n)-threshold access structure, we can realize that H(V i ) = H(S)/L (6), and hence, ramp SS schemes are more efficient than perfect SS schemes (5; 6). Furthermore, ramp schemes with general access structures are studied in (7; 9; 8).
Since intermediate sets in ramp SS schemes are allowed to leak out a part of a secret, it is important to analyze how the secret partially leaks out. For example, if a secret is a personal data that consists of name, address, job, income, bank account, etc., any part of the secret should not leak out explicitly. However, in the case that the security is measured by the conditional entropy, we cannot know whether or not some part of the secret can be decrypted from an intermediate set. Hence, Yamamoto introduced the notion of strong and weak ramp SS schemes (6) . A ramp SS scheme is called a strong ramp SS scheme if it does not leak out any part of a secret explicitly from any intermediate set of shares. A ramp SS scheme is weak if it is not strong. But, it is not given how to construct strong ramp SS schemes for arbitrarily given general access structures although it is known for (k, L, n)-threshold ramp SS schemes in (6) .
In this paper, we discuss strong ramp SS schemes with general access structures. In section 2, we define ramp SS schemes called partially decryptable (PD) ramp SS schemes, in which every intermediate set can decrypt explicitly some parts of a secret. Then, we point out that (k, L, n)-threshold ramp SS schemes based on Shamir's polynomial interpolation method are not always strong. In section 3, we propose how to convert PD ramp SS schemes into strong ramp SS schemes by using a linear transformation, and we clarify that any access structure can be realized as a strong ramp SS scheme if it can be realized as a weak ramp SS scheme.
Background and Preliminaries
Let V = {V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V n } be the set of all shares, and let 2 V be the family of all the subsets of V . Denote a secret by an L-tuple S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S L }, and each element of S is assumed to be a mutually independent random variable according to the uniform distribution which takes values in a finite field F. We assume that |F| is sufficiently large 3 . Then, denote by H(S) and H(A) the entropies of the secret S and a set of shares A ⊆ V , respectively.
V , we define ramp SS schemes as follows: 
2 Equation (1) implies that secret S leaks out from any set A ∈ A with the amount of ( /L)H(S). Especially, S can be completely decrypted from any A ∈ A L , but any A ∈ A 0 leaks out no information of S. Hence, in the case of L = 1, ramp SS schemes reduce to perfect SS schemes.
For example, the access structure of a (k, L, n)-threshold ramp SS scheme (5; 6) can be defined as
It is shown in (7) that ramp SS schemes with general access structures can be constructed if and only if the following monotonicity condition is satisfied.
Theorem 2 ((7))
A ramp SS scheme with access structure the monotonicity in the following sense:
In the case of L = 1, (2) in Theorem 2 coincides with the necessary and sufficient condition to realize a perfect SS scheme with an access structure Γ 1 = {A 0 , A 1 }, which is proved in (10) From Theorem 2, the minimal access structure A − , = 1, 2, . . . , L can be defined as follows:
Proof of Theorem 2 ( (7)): We will prove only the sufficiency of (2) because the necessity is obvious. Let
From (10), in the case that (2) holds, we can construct a perfect SS scheme for the secret S with the access structureΓ
. . , V ,n } be the whole shares of such a perfect SS scheme with access structureΓ for the secret S .
Now, we define
Then, it is easy to check that the share set V = {V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V n } realizes the ramp SS scheme with access structure Γ L for the secret S. In this case, we can decrypt {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S } from a share set A ∈Ã , although A does not leak out any information of {S , S +1 , . . . , S L }, and hence, (1) is satisfied.
2
The method shown in the above proof, say KOSOT method, can construct a ramp SS scheme for any ramp access structure satisfying (2) . But, we note that the ramp SS scheme constructed by KOSOT method is not efficient generally.
In ramp SS schemes, the coding rate of the i-th share can be defined as ρ i def = H(V i )/H(S), which should be as small as possible to realize efficient ramp SS schemes. It is known that ρ i ≥ 1/L must hold for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n in any ramp SS scheme with L-level access structure Γ L (6; 7) and the equality ρ i = 1/L can always be attained for any (k, L, n)-threshold ramp access structure (6; 5). But, KOSOT method can attain only ρ i ≥ H(V i )/H(S) = 1. For instance, the following example shows that there exists a ramp SS scheme with a general access structure, which is more efficient than the ramp SS scheme constructed by KOSOT method.
Example 3 Consider the following access structure Γ ex 3 for the set of shares
Then, by letting the secret be S = {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 }, a ramp SS scheme for the access structure Γ ex 3 in (4)- (6) can be realized as
where R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 are mutually independent random numbers which take values in the same finite field F. In this example, it holds that ρ 1 = 1/3 and 
Similarly, we can easily check that H(S|V
In the same way as Example 3, if the partial information of the secret can be explicitly decrypted from every intermediate set of shares, it is easy to calculate the amount of leaked information.
Hence, we give the definition of the partially decryptable ramp SS schemes, which characterizes the ramp SS schemes constructed by KOSOT method or shown in Example 3. 
Definition 4 Let
for all A ∈ A where
From (12) and (13) We note that the amount of the leaked information about S from a share set A ∈ A is ( /L)H(S) in PD ramp SS schemes. Hence, if the security is measured only by the conditional entropy as shown in (1), there is no difference between Definition 1 and Definition 4. That is, both definitions guarantee the same security in the case that S is meaningless if some part of S is missing. However, if each part of S has explicit meaning, PD ramp SS schemes are not secure, and hence, not desirable.
To overcome such defects, Yamamoto defined strong ramp SS schemes as follows (6) 4 :
. . , S L } and Γ L be a secret and an access structure, respectively. Then, {S, V , Γ L } is called a strong ramp SS scheme if all A ∈ A satisfy (1) and
for all
Definition 6 implies that the strong ramp SS schemes do not leak out any part of the secret explicitly from intermediate or forbidden sets. Now, from this point of view, we review the (k, L, n)-threshold SS scheme based on Shamir's interpolation method.
Remark 7 The (k, L, n)-threshold ramp SS scheme constructed by Shamir's interpolation method (1) is not always a strong ramp SS scheme. For instance, consider a (4, 2, 15)-threshold ramp SS scheme by using the following polynomial of degree 3 over the finite field
where S = {S 1 , S 2 } is a secret, and R 1 and R 2 are independent random numbers. The i-th share is given by Remark 7 shows that it is difficult to construct strong ramp SS schemes in general. In (6), it is proposed how to construct strong (k, L, n)-threshold ramp SS schemes, but it is not known how to construct strong ramp SS schemes for general access structures.
Fortunately, PD ramp SS schemes with general access structure Γ L can easily be constructed, for instance by KOSOT method, if Γ L satisfies the monotonicity defined by (2) in Theorem 2. Furthermore, it is easy to calculate how much information leaks out from each intermediate set in PD ramp SS schemes. Therefore, we propose a method to construct strong ramp SS schemes with general access structures based on PD ramp SS schemes.
Strong Ramp Secret Sharing Schemes with General Access Structures
In this section, we propose how to construct a strong ramp SS scheme with general access structure Γ L from a given PD ramp SS scheme with the same access structure Γ L .
Assume that a PD ramp SS scheme with access structure
Then, denote by φ Γ L (S, R) the encoder of the PD ramp SS scheme with the access structure Γ L for the secret S, where R represents a set of random numbers used in the encoder. Then, we choose publicly an L × L non-singular matrix T and define a new encoder
The next theorem gives the necessary and sufficient condition of T that realizes a strong ramp SS scheme with the access structure Γ L for secret
Theorem 8 Suppose that the encoder φ Γ (S, R) of a PD ramp SS scheme
with an access structure Γ L for a secret S is given. Let S A be the partial information of the secret S that can be decrypted explicitly from a share set A in the PD ramp SS scheme, and denote by I(A) the set of indices of
Then, the necessary and sufficient condition of T to realize a strong ramp SS scheme {S , V , Γ L } is given by
..,ju is the minor that consists of the i 1 -th, i 2 -th, . . . , i u -th rows, and the j 1 -th, j 2 -th, . . . , j u -th columns of T −1 . 2
Remark 9 Theorem 8 implies that any strong ramp SS schemes can be derived from the corresponding PD ramp SS schemes without loss of coding rates. 2

Proof of Theorem 8:
Since the matrix T is non-singular, S has one to one correspondence with S . Hence, S is also a set of L mutually independent random variables according to the same uniform distribution. Therefore, it holds that H(S) = H(S ) = L log |F| where F is a finite field in which S , = 1, 2, . . . , L take values.
Then, for any
. . , A L } is the access structure of the PD ramp SS scheme, we have
Therefore, (1) holds for secret S . Next, we have for any
where equalities (a), (b), and (c) hold because of (12), (17) and (13), respectively. Hence, (14) is satisfied, which implies that (17) is sufficient.
Finally, we note that the necessity of (17) is given by
where x i and y j must satisfy for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L} that
Note that every minor of the Hilbert matrix is also a Hilbert matrix, and the determinant of the matrix T H can be calculated as follows:
Hence, it is clear that every minor of T H is non-singular if and only if
are satisfied for i = j in addition to (21). Since |F| is usually assumed to be sufficiently large in ordinal ramp SS schemes, it is easy to choose
and
satisfying (21) and (23).
We also note from the proof of Theorem 2 that a PD ramp SS scheme can always be constructed by KOSOT method if the monotonicity condition is satisfied. Therefore, from Theorem 8, the following theorem holds. 
Hence, by applying the above matrix T ex H to access structure Γ ex 3 , the PD ramp SS scheme given by (7)- (10) can be transformed into a strong ramp SS scheme 
